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This paper examines cash dividends and share repurchases in Japan - discerning between keiretsu
and non-keiretsu groupings of ﬁrms - during the period 1990 to 2008, a period of extensive Japanese
corporate governance reform. As in the United States, share repurchases in Japan have grown strikingly
across ﬁrm groupings even relative to cash dividends which have also increased. Unlike in the United
States, cash dividends remain the dominant form of payout across the groupings of ﬁrms in Japan.
Despite extensive corporate governance reform, the keiretsu grouping of ﬁrms exhibits a comparative
reticence to alter its corporate payout policy. In particular, it remains the case that keiretsu ﬁrms
disburse relatively large amounts of cash, they rely relatively heavily on cash dividends rather than
share repurchases, they exhibit a greater tendency to discontinue cash dividend payouts, their payouts
are relatively sensitive to earnings and these payouts respond relatively rapidly with respect to earnings.
In addition, the cash dividend payouts in keiretsu ﬁrms have been relatively concentrated, while these
payouts from non-keiretsu ﬁrms concentrate increasingly over time. The ﬁndings also suggest that
larger ﬁrms in Japan are more likely to payout and if they decide to do so they tend to payout more.
As the level of concentration of ownership in Japanese ﬁrms increases the amount of cash dividends
disbursed decreases. Privatized ﬁrms are more likely to pay cash dividends and if they decide to do so
and they are not keiretsu aﬃliated they tend to payout more.
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What determines Japanese corporate payout policy? Does Japan’s ﬁnancial deregulation
towards a more market oriented system have implications for Japanese corporate payout
policy - particularly for the payout policy of the keiretsu aﬃliated grouping of ﬁrms? Does
the determination of corporate payout policy in Japan diﬀer from corporate payout pol-
icy determination in the United States? Two interlinked strands of the ﬁnance literature
motivate this article. The ﬁrst strand relates to the determination of corporate payout pol-
icy and the second strand relates to studies of the Japanese keiretsu corporate governance
structure.
The topic of corporate payout policy determination is fraught with potentially mutually
inclusive theories. By way of a foundation, the Miller-Modigliani (1961) irrelevance propo-
sition indicates that, within a stylised setting, once corporate investment policy is optimal
(i.e. once the Fisherian Net Present Value rule is satisﬁed), corporate payout policy has
no implication for the value of the ﬁrm. In this setting, corporate payout policy merely
involves diﬀerent methods of distributing free cash ﬂows and hence has no implication for
the value arising from capital budgeting decisions. Notwithstanding, DeAngelo, and DeAn-
gelo (2006) conclude that the distribution/retention decision with regard to free cash ﬂows,
even assuming the stylised setting outlined in the Miller-Modigliani (1961) proposition, has
’ﬁrst-order value consequences’. In brief, this follows from the fact that the feasible set
of distribution/retention decisions, in the Miller-Modigliani (1961) stylised setting, is ex-
actly the optimal set, i.e. full payout. This eﬀectively precludes a payout policy decision.
To mitigate for this oversight, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) advocate an extension of
the classic Fisherian Net Present Value ‘rule’ with regard to capital budgeting decisions,
to include the distribution of the full present value of free cash ﬂows during the life of
the ﬁrm. Essentially, it is now evident that there is considerable scope for value creation
and destruction, by means of corporate payout policy. As a result, the determination of
corporate payout policy merits careful attention.
In relaxing the conﬁguration of assumptions underpinning the Miller-Modigliani (1961)
proposition extended to include the assumption of full payout, several theories, which are
mutually inclusive in principle, arise concerning the determination of the timing and form
of optimal corporate payout policy. The open question appears to hinge on the relative
importance of these theories with regard to explaining the determination of corporate pay-
out policy. In particular, these theories comprise: ﬁrst, the so-called agency cost-based life
cycle theory (see Fama and French, 2001 and Grullon et al. 2005, DeAngelo and DeAngelo,
2006, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz, 2006) which implies that the decision to distribute
or retain free cash ﬂows, a trade-oﬀ between the prospect of credit constraints and exces-
sive ﬁnancial slack, varies according to the evolution of the phases of the ﬁrm’s life cycle
i.e. as typiﬁed by a ﬁrm’s size, proﬁtability, the nature of its capital structure and the
growth opportunities of the ﬁrm. The reconciling of Jensen’s agency theory (Jensen, 1986
and LaPorta et al. (2000)) with the life-cycle theory appears particularly beneﬁcial. In-
deed, the agency requirement of persuasion, on the part of the principal, for the agent to
distribute free cash ﬂows may be requisite such that the corporation disgorges cash. Sec-
ond, the so-called signaling theory (see Bhattacharya 1979, John and Williams, 1985, and
Miller and Rock, 1985) which emphasises the importance of utilising corporate payout pol-
icy, to circumvent the information asymmetry which may arise between the management
2of the ﬁrm, who enjoy insider information, and the ﬁrm’s investors. Third, the catering
theory (see Baker and Wurgler, 2004a, b and Li and Lie, 2006) of corporate payout policy
determination, which highlights the importance of corporate payout policy to satisfy the
preferences of various, possibly time-varying, heterogenous payout clienteles, who ascribe a
corresponding dividend premium (discount) to share prices.
In this article, we turn to examine the relative importance of these theories of corporate
payout policy determination in the Japanese corporate environment for several compelling
reasons. In the ﬁrst instance, the co-existence of aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms, to
keiretsu industrial groupings within the Japanese corporate sector, implies an opportunity
to examine the determination of corporate payout policy across distinct corporate gover-
nance structures, associated with diﬀering levels of agency costs and informational asymme-
tries, within the borders of a single nation (Dewenter and Warther, 1998 and Wu and Xu,
2005). As we know, these market imperfections - levels of agency costs and informational
asymmetries - are centrally important to theoretical models of corporate payout behaviour.
Second, following extensive ﬁnancial deregulation these keiretsu aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated
corporate governance structures may be developing along similar lines, implying a possible
convergence in payout policy determination in Japan. In addition, these developments in
the corporate governance environment in Japan are expected to facilitate a greater displace-
ment of wealth across assets. This may, following Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b), introduce
a dividend premium eﬀect. Third, the Japanese corporate environment is important. It
is underpinned by the Japanese economy which, despite a declining trend in its real gross
domestic product growth rates since the 1960s, remains of global economic importance.1
In the same vein, the Japanese economy comprises a stock market of global signiﬁcance,
the Tokyo Stock Exchange.2 Taking these three points together, the Japanese corporate
environment may comprise a valuable opportunity to examine the implications of market
imperfections - agency costs and information asymmetries - with regard to the determina-
tion of corporate payout policy against a backdrop of extensive deregulation and a globally
important economy which is linked to a globally important stock exchange.
Notwithstanding the outlined relevance of the Japanese corporate environment with
regard to developing our understanding of the determination of corporate payout policy
behaviour, there is a dearth of evidence concerning the payout policy of corporations head-
quartered in Japan and listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. In contrast, the evolution and
determination of corporate payout policy in the United States has received considerable
attention in the literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003 and Skinner, 2008 and the references
there-in). In particular, a relatively small series of articles focus, in the main, on Japanese
corporate payout policy (see Dewenter and Warther, 1998, Gul, 1998, Conroy et al., 2000,
Charitou, 2000 and Kato et al. 2002) while an even more limited set of contributions, to the
international corporate payout policy literature, include Japan in their analyses (see Denis
and Osobov, 2008, Chay and Suh, 2009 and Lee and Suh, 2009). Taken together, these
studies tend to neglect the implications of the distinctive corporate governance structures
in Japan for Japanese corporate payout and/or they neglect the surge in share repurchases
1According to the International Monetary Fund 2008 and the World Bank 2008 estimates of sovereign
real GDP, Japan is one of the largest three global economies, after the European Union and the United
States.
2Japan’s national stock exchange, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, exhibits a market capitalization which
remains the second largest in the world, after the New York stock exchange. See www.world-exchanges.org.
3conducted in Japan. In our study, we contribute to the literature on corporate payout
policy by accounting, inter alia, for both repurchases of shares as well as the keiretsu origin
of a signiﬁcant cohort of Japanese corporations.
To elaborate on our contribution to the literature on corporate payout policy in Japan,
its novelty is ﬁvefold. First, in contrast to the preponderance of the literature, which focuses
on why ﬁrms alter their dividends, the information content of dividends (Benartzi et al.
1997 and Grullon et al. 2002) and more recently whether or not to pay dividends (Baker
and Wurgler 2004a,b, DeAngelo et al. 2006 and Denis and Osobov 2008) we follow von Eije
and Megginson (2008) and provide evidence concerning the centrally important question of
why some ﬁrms disburse high dividends (or total payouts) relative to others. Second, we
contrast the corporate payout policy of keiretsu aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated groupings of
Japanese ﬁrms as well as its determination prior to the banking crisis of 1998 and during
the subsequent regime of extensive legislative reform which aims to render the Japanese
corporate environment more market oriented. Third, with resepct to our data, we study
1377 ﬁrms headquartered in Japan, of which 204 ﬁrms are aﬃliated to the keiretsu, during
the period 1990 through to 2008. This implies a considerably larger sample than those
samples previously employed to investigate corporate payout policy in Japan.3 Fourth, we
mitigate in several ways for shortcomings in the extant literature. Speciﬁcally, the Japanese
corporate payout policy literature neglects to consider, when assessing the importance of
the agency-cost based theory, the leverage of the ﬁrm. In respect to the life-cycle theory,
the age of the ﬁrm since its date of incorporation is not yet examined in the literature
on Japanese corporate payout. In addition, when assessing informational asymmetries
and cash ﬂow uncertainty, the extant Japanese literature on corporate payout neglects to
account for the proxy explanatory variables, earnings reporting frequency and income risk.
Finally, in the vein of Skinner (2008) and von Eije and Megginson (2008) as well as Denis
and Osobov (2008), we turn to assess dividend payout, both in respect to its development
over time and in regard to the determination of the dividend payout. Taken together,
we therefore document and explain, with considerable novelty, the total corporate payout
policy of Japanese ﬁrms, with a particular focus on keiretsu aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated
groupings.
Our ﬁndings can be summarised using three sets of key points. First, the ﬁndings
indicate that as in the United States, share repurchases in Japan have grown strikingly
- across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrm groupings - even relative to cash dividends which
have also increased. This rapid growth in cash dividends and share repurchases in Japan
commences in 1999 in the immediate wake of the enactment of a raft of legislation aimed
at reforming Japanese corporate governance. Unlike in the United States, however, cash
dividends remain the dominant form of payout across the groupings of keiretsu aﬃliated
and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms in Japan. Second, despite the enactment of this raft of legislation,
speciﬁc to the keiretsu grouping of ﬁrms is a comparative reticence to alter its corpo-
rate payout policy. In particular, the keiretsu ﬁrms continue to disburse relatively large
amounts of cash throughout, they persist in relying relatively heavily on cash dividends
rather than share repurchases, they show a relatively pronounced tendency to discontinue
cash dividends, they show a relatively great sensitivity to earnings and a relatively large
3For example, the next most extensive study of Japanese ﬁrm payout policy is provided by Denis and
Osobov, 2008, which examined 12,747 observations of ﬁrm years while we study 18,554 observations of ﬁrm
years.
4speed of adjustment parameter, in relation to the Lintner (1956) model, with respect to
earnings alterations and keiretsu ﬁrms are relatively reluctant to avail of cash dividends as
well as share repurchases, rather than just cash dividends, to absorb the variation in ﬁrm
earnings. These ﬁndings are indicative of the continuation of a relatively ﬂexible keiretsu
payout policy in Japan, which is consistent with a continuing relative absence of agency
costs and information asymmetries in these ﬁrms. In addition, the cash dividend payouts
in keiretsu ﬁrms have been relatively concentrated, while these payouts from non-keiretsu
ﬁrms concentrate increasingly over time.
Third, controlling for a large set of pronounced eﬀects, previously documented in the
literature, we examine the relative importance in explaining the corporate payout of proxy
explanatory variables associated with the phase of the ﬁnancial life-cycle of the ﬁrm, the
presence of agency costs, the ﬁrm’s investment opportunity set, uncertainty in the ﬁrms’
cashﬂows, information asymmetries, the recent stock market performance, catering theory
eﬀects, whether the ﬁrm has been privatized and a secular trend in payouts over time. The
ﬁndings suggest inter alia that larger ﬁrms are more likely to payout and if they decide to
do so they tend to payout more. As the level of concentration of ownership in Japanese
ﬁrms increases the amount of cash dividends disbursed decreases. Privatized ﬁrms are more
likely to pay cash dividends and if they decide to do so and they are not keiretsu aﬃliated
they tend to payout more. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that internal measures of cash ﬂow
uncertainty, relating to net income and the operating rate of return, are associated with a
decline in the probability of a ﬁrm to pay cash dividends and, income risk in particular, is
also associated with a decline in the amount of cash dividends paid as well as the probability
of a ﬁrm to undertake share repurchases. Finally, the earnings to asset ratio is associated,
across ﬁrm groupings, with a declining eﬀect over time on the decision to pay cash dividends
and an increasing positive eﬀect on the amounts of cash dividend payout. Taken together,
despite a relative reluctance on the part of keiretsu ﬁrms to alter their payout policies, these
ﬁndings reﬂect a marked growth in payout in Japan across ﬁrm groupings. The relative
importance of agency costs and life cycle theory to explain the payout policies of Japanese
ﬁrms is evident from the regression analyses with regard to the likelihood to pay of Japanese
ﬁrms and their payout amounts.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 the received literature
on Japanese corporate payout policy is assessed with a view to motivating our study. In
Section 3 our data set is outlined and the constructed proxy explanatory variables are
described. In Section 4 we present and discuss our hypotheses and our empirical results.
Finally, a summary and concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
2 Japanese Corporate Payout Literature
The quintessential characteristic feature of the Japanese corporate sector, dating back to
the 1950s, is the co-existence of keiretsu and non-keiretsu structures of corporate governance
(Bergl¨ oﬀ and Perotti, 1994 and Milhaupt, 2005).
The keiretsu structure of corporate governance comprises ﬁrms aﬃliated either verti-
cally, through buyer and seller relationships, or horizontally, typically organised around
a ﬁnancial institution e.g. the DKB, Fuyo, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sanwa, and Sumitomo
keiretsu. These keiretsu groupings have existed in a safe guarded regulatory environment
5allowing preferential trade relations as well as close ﬁnancial and personal relations with
its main bank, extending to implications for the corporate governance of the ﬁrm (Aoki,
Patrick and Sheard, 1994). In particular, horizontal aﬃliations entail a main bank serving to
fulﬁll three centrally important functions. First, the main bank provides access to ﬁnance
for even the most highly leveraged ﬁrms (Prowse, 1992). Second, the main bank serves
to monitor the member ﬁrms by availing of its informational advantage (Hoshi, Kashyap
and Scharfstein, 1991, Douthett and Jung, 2001 and Bartov, Goldberg and Kim, 2001).
Third, the main bank may aid and/or gradualy unwind keiretsu member ﬁrms which are
in ﬁnancial distress (Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein, 1990, Schaede, 2004).
One argument is that these facets of the keiretsu corporate governance structure have
enabled ﬁnancing and disciplining which imply fewer agency conﬂicts, fewer informational
asymmetries and a markedly longer-term perspective than generally arises in the broader
ﬁnancial markets or in those ﬁrms in Japan which are not aﬃliated to a keiretsu industrial
grouping (Dewenter and Warther, 1998 and Wu and Xu, 2005). 4 In the context of this
corporate environment, where there are possibly marked diﬀerences in terms of market
imperfections across keiretsu aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms in Japan, there is a valuable
opportunity to assess the importance of theories of corporate payout policy determination
which are founded on these market imperfections.
Notwithstanding, the keiretsu structure of corporate governance is not necessarily ex-
tant. Milhaupt (2005) and Schaede (2006) ﬁnd that the prevalence of the keiretsu corporate
governance structure has possibly declined during recent decades, alongside Japan’s ﬁnan-
cial deregulation. This deregulation, which commenced in the mid-1970s but which has been
fast-tracked since 1998 in a so-called ’Big Bang’ of legislative reform has been implemented
in the Japanese corporate environment with a view to moving that environment towards
a relatively market oriented corporate governance and ﬁnance system and, as a result, has
involved a disintermediation process away from a main bank oriented system. Speciﬁcally,
since the banking crisis of 1998, a raft of legislation has been drafted culminating in the
New Corporate Law in 2006 (Gibson, 1998 and Schaede, 2006b) and has incentivated the
reorganisation of the Japanese corporate environment.
Alongside these considerable legislative and governmental interventions, cross and long-
term shareholdings have markedly declined in Japan between 1990 and 2002 (Milhaupt,
2005). In addition, Morck and Nakamura (1999, 2000) indicate that there were relatively
few takeovers in Japan prior to the late 1990s while Brown and Fung (2009) document
considerable growth in take over activity in Japan subsequent to the regulatory ’Big Bang’
in 1998, speciﬁcally during the period 2000 through to 2004. As indicated by Schaede
(2004), ’the pillars of the keiretsu and the main bank system began to crumble’ as a result
of regulatory reform initiated in 1998.5 Indeed, even in the few years prior to the ’Big
Bang’ regulatory reform in 1998, Wu and Xu (2005) ﬁnd that Japanese corporate dividend
policy commences to have a signiﬁcant positive impact on ﬁrm value consistent with the
4Wu and Xu (2005) observe that while the centrally important role of the ﬁnancial institution has been
viewed as mitigating for agency conﬂicts and information asymmetries, the ﬁnancial institution may also
avail of the arrangement as a rent seeking opportunity. Hence, the relative absence of market imperfections
in keiretsu aﬃliated ﬁrms does not necessarily imply that the corporate governance of these ﬁrms is value-
maximising (Morck and Nakamura, 1999, Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001 and Wu and Xu, 2005).
5By 2003, the Japanese government was obliged to purchase bank shares on a large scale to enable the
Japanese banks to maintain the 8 % BIS capital adequacy ratio.
6importance of corporate payout policy in a competitive environment exhibiting market
imperfections.
Japan-speciﬁc Studies of Corporate Payout
To commence, we consider a set of studies which focuses principally on Japan. Dewenter
and Warther (1998) assume diﬀering levels of informational asymmetries and agency con-
ﬂicts across the Japanese corporate environment and ﬁrms in the United States. They
report corroborative evidence with regard to Japanese dividend policy. In particular,
Japanese ﬁrms exhibit weaker stock price responses to dividend omissions and initiations,
Japanese ﬁrms are less reluctant to discontinue and reduce dividends, and following the
Lintner (1956) model’s speed-of-adjustment coeﬃcient, the dividend payouts of Japanese
ﬁrms are more responsive to variations in earnings than U.S. ﬁrms. In addition, they show
that the payout policy of keiretsu ﬁrms, compared with non-keiretsu ﬁrms, is relatively
responsive to ﬁrm performance and it is consistent with fewer informational asymmetries
and fewer agency costs. Taken together, the reported ﬁndings are consistent with the joint
hypothesis that Japanese ﬁrms, and aﬃliated keiretsu ﬁrms in particular, experience less
information asymmetry and fewer agency conﬂicts than U.S. ﬁrms, and, moreover, that
these market imperfections aﬀect dividend policy.
Nevertheless, Charitou (2000) elaborates on the information content in the dividend
payout policy of Japanese ﬁrms. He reports that during the period 1984 through to 1995
the dividend reductions of Japanese ﬁrms are indicative of the trajectory of future earnings.
However, Charitou (2000) neglects to account for a key feature of an important cohort of
Japanese ﬁrms, the keiretsu corporate governance structure. In contrast to these latter
ﬁndings in Charitou (2000), Conroy et al. (2000) report ﬁndings which control, inter alia,
for keiretsu interdependencies and ﬁnd that the information content and real cash ﬂow
eﬀect of dividend anouncements, as observed on share prices during the period, 1988 to
1993, is tenuous and is restricted to forecasts of next year’s dividend. In particular, Conroy
et al. (2000) avail of the practice of ﬁrms in Japan to announce dividends and earnings
as well as associated management forecasts of dividends and earnings simultaneously, with
a view to disentangling the real and purely informational eﬀects of cash dividends. Their
ﬁndings in respect to corporate payout in Japan are consistent with the Modigliani-Miller
(1961) dividend irrelevance proposition.
Turning to the contribution of Gul (1998). He examines, inter alia, the corporate
payout policy of Japanese ﬁrms in the period 1988 to 1992, and reveals a robust negative
relation between ﬁrm growth opportunities and dividend yield, while allowing for keiretsu
aﬃliation, ﬁrm size, industry regulation and proﬁtability. In addition, his ﬁndings reﬂect
higher debt levels, even controlling for growth opportunities in aﬃliated keiretsu ﬁrms,
consistent with a relatively interdependent corporate governance structure in these ﬁrms
reducing the probability of bankruptcy. Gul (1998) also indicates that keiretsu ﬁrms tend
to payout more than non-emphkeiretsu ﬁrms. In contrast, Kato et al. (2002) ﬁnd evidence
that dividend policy is not used to primarily curtail the over-investment dilemma in Japan
but rather it is used to convey information about the ﬁrms’ future cash ﬂows. In addition,
they indicate that investment spending is very sensitive to liquidity constraints and that the
market reacts relatively strongly to dividend announcements for non-keiretsu ﬁrms relative
to keiretsu ﬁrms.
7Taken together, the set of Japan-focused studies indicates a relatively weak stock price
reaction to dividend announcements in Japan relative to the stock price reaction in the
United States. This is consistent with the assumption that Japanese ﬁrms tend to have
fewer agency conﬂicts and a relatively low level of informational asymmetries, however, there
is some controversy concerning the relative importance of these market imperfections. In
addition, it should be noted that the single country studies neglect to account for a range
of proxy variables allowed for in relatively recent international studies of corporate payout
and, in addition, they do not reﬂect the emergent importance of share repurchases as a
component of corporate payout in Japan.
International Studies of Corporate Payout which include Japan
More recently, several international studies of corporate payout policy, have included an
examination of Japanese corporate payout (Denis and Osobov, 2008, Chay and Suh, 2009
and Lee and Suh, 2009).
Turning ﬁrstly to the international corporate payout study in relation to ﬁrms listed
in the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France and Japan by Denis and Osobov (2008). This
study adopts both time series and cross-sectional analyses, with a US$ numeraire currency,
to investigate, inter alia, the propensity of ﬁrms to pay cash dividends in Japan during the
period 1989 through to 2002. The study indicates a slight decline in the observed propensity
to pay cash dividends and the relative prevelance of cash dividend abandonment in Japan,
this is probably due to transitory earnings problems during the econonomic slowdown of
the 1990s. The study also provides mixed ﬁndings in respect to catering theory, despite an
estimated positive dividend premium, the median annual percentage of ﬁrms in Japan that
switch their dividend status in a given year is less than 5%, and the switch in status appears
to be unrelated to the dividend premium. In addition, Denis and Osobov (2008) report
a positive relation between the propensity to pay dividends and ﬁrm size, proﬁtability as
well as the capital mix of retained earnings to total equity of the ﬁrm. They also report
that growth opportunities are mixed across dividend payers and non-payers in Japan and
mixed results are also found with regard to the sign of the relation between dividend payout
amounts and growth opportunities, contingent on the proxy explanatory variable used and
the sample of Japanese ﬁrms examined. On the whole, these ﬁndings clearly run counter to
the ﬁrst-order importance of the signaling and catering hypotheses while these ﬁndings do,
nevertheless, lend considerable support to the life cycle theory of corporate payout policy
in Japan.
Motivated by survey ﬁndings provided by Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2005) with
respect to the importance of cash-ﬂow uncertainty in payout policy determination, Chay
and Suh (2009), adopt a year-by-year cross-sectional methodology, and examine scaled cor-
porate payout internationally including a focus on Japan during the period 1994 through
to 2005. They ﬁnd that cash ﬂow uncertainty (i.e. stock return volatility) exerts a strong
relatively pronounced (relative to other important theoretical determinants) negative in-
ﬂuence on the amount and probability of dividend payout (scaled by earnings or sales) of
ﬁrms in Japan, as well as internationally. Interestingly, they also ﬁnd that this eﬀect is
independent to the phase of the ﬁnancial life-cycle of the ﬁrms involved and comparable in
importance to the impact of proﬁtability on payout. It may follow that this negative rela-
tion arises from the increased costliness of raising funds externally as cash ﬂow uncertainty
8rises in conjunction with the ’sticky’ dividend phenomenon which implies an aversity, on
the part of management, to allow dividends to decline. As in Denis and Osobov (2008),
ﬁndings indicating ambiguity, with regard to the importance of growth opportunities, and
hence agency contracting costs, as a determinant of scaled payout are reported (there is
a signiﬁcant negative correlation between dividends scaled by earnings and the market to
book ratio, there is a markedly less pervasive correlation between dividends scaled by sales
and the market to book ratio, leaving considerable ambiguity). Turning to total payout,
which includes share repurchases, cash ﬂow uncertainty also imparts a negative eﬀect on
the amount of total payout (also scaled by earnings or sales).
Lee and Suh (2009) examine the sample period from 1998 through to 2006 and provide
an examination of ﬁrms involved in dividend payouts, share repurchases as well as non-
payers in Japan (as well as in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom
and the United States). First, they report that Japan is conspicuous, outside the United
States, in exhibiting a high incidence of share repurchases, nevertheless, payouts in Japan
stem principally from cash dividends. Second, those Japanese ﬁrms which do not pay
cash dividends and perform share repurchases tend to be at the early stage of the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial life cycle. They tend to be small ﬁrms with low proﬁtability although with high
proﬁt variability. They also report, contrary to the signaling theory of corporate payout,
that share repurchases are a ﬂexible means of distributing cash built up through reductions
in capital expenditure rather than improved operating performance. This ﬁnding is in
line with the free cash ﬂow hypothesis, the agency-cost based life-cycle theory. In short,
the ﬁrms don’t ﬁnance repurchases by reducing dividends - these payout methods are not
perfect substitutes. Lee and Suh (2009) also report diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics (ﬁrm
size, proﬁtability, retained earnings and cash-ﬂow variability) in regard to share repurchase
activity across dividend payers (large ﬁrm size and large cash holdings - in contrast to
Grulon and Michaely 2002) and non-payers. These ﬁndings are also in line with the lifecycle
theory.
Taken together, while Denis and Osobov (2008), Chay and Suh (2008) and Lee and Suh
(2009) provide valuable insight into the corporate payout policy of Japanese ﬁrms their
contributions neglect to account for important proxy explanatory variables of the various
theories examined. Speciﬁc proxy variables related to the agency-cost based lifecycle theory
of corporate payout are neglected, for example, whether the ﬁrm has been privatised and the
age of the ﬁrm - i.e. the number of years elapsed since incorporation. In addition, in regard
to informational asymmetries, these articles neglect to account for the earnings reporting
frequency of the ﬁrms. The studies also neglect to account for a speciﬁc type of income
risk, a scaled measurement of the standard deviation of net income. Furthermore, market
value, a key proxy explanatory variable for the lifecycle phase and the median market to
book value, the key measurement with respect to catering theory, are not adopted either
in Chay and Suh (2008) or Lee and Suh (2009). Thus, their importance with regard to
Japanese corporate payout, has not been examined since the period prior to 2002, and then
solely in respect to the propensity of ﬁrms to pay.
Furthermore, the leverage ratio and the relative stock return have not been considered,
except in regard to the share repurchases behaviour in Lee and Suh (2009) while the own-
ership structure, the standard deviation of operating income and the volatility of the stock
returns are not examined except as a cross-sectional determinant of corporate payout pol-
9icy in Chay and Suh (2008). Therefore, these marked omissions indicate an opportunity
to re-examine corporate payout policy in Japan. Finally, these international studies also
neglect to address the keiretsu character of an important cohort of Japanese ﬁrms with
a view to explicating the determination of corporate payout policy. Ofcourse, these two
co-existing structures of corporate governance in Japan, the structure of keiretsu aﬃliated
and the structure of non-aﬃliated ﬁrms, provides a valuable opportunity to evaluate pre-
dominant theories of corporate payout policy with respect to agency costs and infomration
asymmetries in Japan.
3 Data and Proxy explanatory variables
Our data, which extends from 1990 through to 2008, is sourced in the Worldscope and the
Amadeus databases, as detailed in table 1. The data is tailored such that it excludes ﬁrms
in the ﬁnancial and utilities industries, as well as American Depositary Receipts and foreign
ﬁrms. The sample also excludes ﬁrms whose dividends are greater than their total sales,
ﬁrms whose dividend, net income or sales ﬁgures are omitted and ﬁrms with negative book
value of equity, market to book ratio, sales, dividends or share repurchases. In addition,
we search the databases for active as well as dead and suspended listings in order to avoid
survivor bias. Otherwise, the sample comprises every ﬁrm headquartered in Japan which
is also listed on the Tokyo stock exchange, for which there is available our set of proxy
explanatory variables. These ﬁlters yield 1377 industrial (and transport) ﬁrms, of which
204 ﬁrms are aﬃliated to the Japanese keiretsu.6 Within this group, 423 ﬁrms disclose their
cash dividend policy in 1990 of which 399 are cash dividend payers. This ﬁgure is 1371 in
2008 of which 1210 pay cash dividends. Turning to repurchase observations, there are 43
ﬁrms which disclose their share repurchases policy in 1990 with only a single ﬁrm observed
to conduct share repurchases. This ﬁgure grows to 840 ﬁrms disclosing their policy in 2008
with 538 ﬁrms conducting share repurchases. The total sample includes 18,554 ﬁrm-year
observations on cash dividends of which 16,203 are cash dividend payers and 2,351 are
ﬁrms that do not pay cash dividends. There are 7,534 ﬁrm-year observations on share
repurchases of which 3,915 ﬁrm-year observations are for repurchasers and 3,619 for non-
repurchasers. Our study examines the Japanese circumstances, separately investigating
keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, using a real Japanese yen numeraire (1990 prices) in each
instance.
[Please insert table 1 about here]
Our principal payout variables are cash dividends (DIV) and share repurchases (SR).
Share repurchases correspond to actual gross amounts.7 We arrange our principal proxy
6Following Brown and Fung (2004), our classiﬁcation is obtained from Industrial Groupings in JapanThe
Anatomy of the Keiretsu (Brown & Company 1999, 2001). As indicated by Wu and Xu (2005), the aﬃliation
to keiretsu groupings tends to be stable over time. Only ﬁrms in the six largest keiretsu groupings are
categorised as keiretsu members. Firms which are listed after 2001 are assumed not to be aﬃliated to
keiretsu groupings due to the unavailability of more recent data.
7Fama and French, 2001 and Skinner, 2008 adjust the share repurchases of their samples of United States
ﬁrms for employee stock options, acquisitions and/or price manipulation to obtain a net measurment of share
repurchases. Their approximation adopts the value of treasury stock to approximate the share repurchases
10explanatory variables into groups according to their advocated theoretical linkages with re-
spect to explicating the agency cost-based theory, the catering theory, the life-cycle theory
and the signaling theory of corporate payout policy as well as a grouping of proxy variables
which are included by way of a robustness check. Our Japanese observations are denomi-
nated using a local currency numeraire, with a view to avoiding spurious inferences following
from the pronounced ﬂuctuation of the reference global currency, during the period 1990
through to 2008.
We assess the empirical importance of the agency cost-based theory adopting 5 proxy ex-
planatory variables. First, following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith et al. (2007) and Pinkowitz
et al. (2006) we adopt cash and short term investments (CASH) as a measurement of
prospective agency costs. The greater these prospective costs, the greater the expected
corporate payout. In a similar vein, following Chay and Suh (2009) and LaPorta et al.
(2000) the more concentrated the ownership of the ﬁrm (OWN), the smaller the scope for
prospective agency costs. Finally, in regard to agency costs, following Black (1976), Jensen
(1986) and von Eije and Megginson (2008), we adopt a leverage ratio (LR) i.e the book
value of debt divided by the book value of assets, to approximate for the scope for prospec-
tive agency costs. The greater the leverage of a ﬁrm the smaller the scope for prospective
agency costs and the smaller the expected payoﬀ. Alternatively, it should be noted, that
the higher leverage may proxy for a ﬁrm’s maturity which would imply a possible positive
relation between ﬁrm payout and the leverage ratio (LR). Fourth, in respect to the devel-
opment of the ﬁrm’s set of investment opportunities, we include in our speciﬁcations the
change in total assets (DAA) following Fama and French (2001) and Denis and Osobov
(2008). Finally, also following in the line of these latter studies, we adopt the market to
book ratio (MBF) to reﬂect the set of the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities. The larger the
investment opportunity set, the smaller the expected payout. Essentially, the shallower the
investment opportunity set, for any given level of cash (CASH) there is a greater scope for
sub-optimal investment by way of agency costs.
Turning now to the life-cycle theory of corporate payout policy, we adopt 3 proxy
explanatory variables. First, following Pan (2007) and von Eije and Megginson (2008), we
include the age (AGE) of the ﬁrm since its date of incorporation. This proxy explanatory
variable for the phase of the life-cycle of the ﬁrm is expected to exhibit a positive relation
with corporate payout. In addition, following, DeAngelo et al. (2006) we include a proxy
explanatory variable for the phase of the life cycle of the ﬁrm, the ratio of retained earnings
to total equity (RETE) and, in the vein of, Fama and French (2001) as well as Grullon
and Michaelly (2002) we adopt the market value of the ﬁrm to reﬂect ﬁrm size (SIZE),
another complementary indication of the phase of the life cycle of the ﬁrm. The greater
the maturity of the individual ﬁrm whether reﬂected in retained earnings to total equity
(RETE) or ﬁrm size (SIZE), the greater its expected payout.
With regard to catering theory, we follow Baker and Wurgler (2004a,b) and specify a
dummy variable (CCD), for frequent payers, that takes the value 1 if natural logarithm of
the median market to book value of a paying ﬁrm is greater than the natural logarithm of
the median market market to book value of a non-paying ﬁrm, otherwise zero. The focus,
activity. Japanese treasury stock, however, consists of the amount of shares repurchased at par. As a result
of the nature of this accounting data in conjunction with the diﬃculty in determining the purpose of the
share repurchases performed as well as to facilitate a comparison across Japan and the United States, we
have chosen to consider gross share repurchases rather than net share repurchases.
11with regard to catering theory, is whether there is a payout (dividend or share repurchase)
premium eﬀect and, if so, how this eﬀect varies over time.
To assess the empirical importance of the signaling theory of corporate payout policy
we turn to a single proxy explanatory variables. We initially follow Wood (2001) and von
Eije and Megginson (2008) and specify an Earnings Reporting Frequency (ERF) variable,
corresponding to the frequency at which earnings are reported, by a ﬁrm, per annum.
The greater the frequency, the smaller the expected payout and the lower the incentive to
payout. Alternatively, it is noted that a greater reporting frequency may result in a larger
payout due to greater transparency.
In addition we adopt 7 further control variables which are also expected to impact
corporate payout. Following Lintner (1956), Miller and Rock (1985) and von Eije and
Megginson (2008), we specify an explanatory variable corresponding to the Earnings Ratio
(EA). It is computed as the earnings before interest but after tax divided by the book value
of total assets. The greater the earnings ratio, the greater the expected payout. Another
variable examined is income uncertainty. Anticipated income uncertainty is expected to
negatively impact cash dividend payouts due to the expected information content of a sub-
sequent cash dividend decline deteriorating ﬁrm value as well as the tendency for external
ﬁnancing to be relatively costly. This latter proxy explanatory variable is operationalised in
three ways: (1) income risk (SDS) is computed following von Eije and Megginson (2008) as
the standard deviation of income during the last 5-years scaled by total sales, (2) operating
proﬁtability volatility (INCV) is computed following Chay and Suh (2009) as the three-year
standard deviation of the operating rate of return and (3) cash-ﬂow uncertainty (VOL24) is
computed following Chay and Suh (2009) and Lintner (1956) as the standard deviation of
stock returns during the most recent 3-year period. The greater the income uncertainty, the
smaller the expected payout. Next, following von Eije and Megginson (2008), we include a
lagged return (DPP). There is expected to be a negative relation between this explanatory
variable and subsequent payout. Following D’Souza and Megginson (1999) and von Eije
and Megginson (2008) we include a dummy variable indicating if the ﬁrm has been priva-
tised (PRIV) or not. If the ﬁrm has been privatised, there is expected to be a consequent
positive payout. Following Fama and French (2001) as well as Denis and Osobov (2008),
we also include in our speciﬁcations a year variable (Year), with a view to assessing secular
trends over time.
4 Empirical Findings
Figure 1 presents the number of observed ﬁrms and the number of observed keiretsu ﬁrms
disclosing their payout policies as well as the number of these ﬁrms actually making pay-
ments during the period 1990 to 2008. In addition, Figure 1 indicates the total number
of observed ﬁrms which discontinue payouts in each year. In particular, Figure 1a and
Figure 1b present these measurements in regard to cash dividends and share repurchases,
respectively.
It is interesting that while the number of observed keiretsu ﬁrms paying cash dividends
remains high and virtually stable throughout, the number of these ﬁrms conducting share
repurchases increases markedly, from a low base, after 1999. Turning to the total number
of keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, this cohort of ﬁrms exhibits a comparable pattern with
12regard to share repurchases, however, alongside the increasing number of observed ﬁrms
over time, following from new listings and improved data coverage, the total number of these
ﬁrms paying cash dividends increases throughout the period 1990 to 2008. The proportion of
the total number of observed ﬁrms paying cash dividends declines only marginally over time.
Taking these inferences together, the proportion of keiretsu ﬁrms electing to conduct cash
dividends or share repurchases, in the post-1999 period, is relatively high, in comparison to
non-keiretsu ﬁrms. While the number of ﬁrms choosing to discontinue cash dividend payouts
remains low, with moderate peaks in 2000 and 2003, the number of ﬁrms discontinuing share
repurchases is relatively high and grows gradually since 2000, reﬂecting a relative variability
(stemming principally from non-keiretsu ﬁrms) of the number of ﬁrms conducting share
repurchases.8 In short, payout discontinuation is generally unusual, particularly in the
context of cash dividend payments.
These ﬁndings indicate that the development of the proportion of Japanese listed ﬁrms
paying cash dividends appears markedly diﬀerent to the stark declines in this proportion
evident in listed ﬁrms in the United States (Fama and French, 2001) and in the European
Union (von Eije and Megginson, 2008), however, the growing proportion of Japanese listed
ﬁrms conducting share repurchases is comparable to ﬁndings in the the United States (Fama
and French, 2001) and in the European Union (von Eije and Megginson, 2008) albeit in
Japan this phenomenon is relatively striking.
Table 2 indicates an annual summary of the total number of Japanese ﬁrms observed
corresponding to Figure 1. In addition, it presents an annual summary of the number of
observations of ﬁrms which disclose both their cash dividend and their share repurchase
policies, the observed number of ﬁrms which pay only cash dividends or conduct only share
repurchases and the table presents the annual summary of the number of observations of
ﬁrms which conduct both types of payout. The table also presents the real value of total
payout, cash dividends and share repurchases each year. The two most interesting series
in this table describe the evolution in the number of companies that disburse both cash
dividends and conduct share repurchases and the total real value of observed ﬁrm payout
in Japan. The series corresponding to ﬁrms availing of both forms of payout indicate a
marked growth in the number of observations of these ﬁrms since 2000 (197 ﬁrms in 2000
to 526 ﬁrms in 2008), while the number of ﬁrms which solely repurchase shares remains
small (14 ﬁrms in 2000 and 11 ﬁrms in 2008) and the number of observed ﬁrms which solely
pay cash dividends exhibits considerable variation although not a clear trend over time (242
ﬁrms in 2000 and 265 ﬁrms in 2008). The other particularly interesting series corresponds
to the total real value of payout, this series exhibits remarkable growth especially since
2000 (600.65 billions of Japanese yen in 2000 to 2420.66 billions of Japanese yen in 2008),
with an increasingly important proportion of this value stemming from share repurchases
although at no point does the value of share repurchases surpass the real value amount
stemming from cash dividends. Hence, unlike in the United States, where ﬁrms which only
pay dividends are largely extinct (Skinner, 2008) a substantial minority of ﬁrms exclusively
pay cash dividends in Japan. Albeit the proportion of observed ﬁrms exclusively paying
cash dividends is declining over time. Overall, as found in the European Union (von Eije
and Megginson, 2008) and in the United States (Fama and French, 2001 and Skinner, 2008),
8The mean proportion of keiretsu aﬃliated ﬁrms electing to discontinue cash dividends (2.75%) is rela-
tively high in the full period(1.89% for non-aﬃliated ﬁrms) and this eﬀect is even more pronounced since
1999 (3.61% of aﬃliated ﬁrms and 1.95% of non-aﬃliated ﬁrms.)
13total real payout is growing over time with relatively pronounced growth stemming from
the real value of the share repurchases conducted.
[Please insert ﬁgure 1 and table 2 about here]
Figure 2 illustrates the real Japanese Yen amounts of observed total payouts, cash div-
idend and share repurchase payouts for all ﬁrms, keiretsu as well as non-keiretsu ﬁrms,
during the period 1990 to 2008. Since 1999, there has been a marked and virtually system-
atic increase year-on-year in real payout amounts across payout methods for all groupings of
observed ﬁrms.9 A decomposition of total payout into cash dividend and share repurchase
payouts, across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, highlights three points of particular inter-
est. First, the growth in share repurchase payout amounts, across keiretsu and non-keiretsu
ﬁrms, is relatively pronounced as it is initiated at a low base. Second, while the prepon-
derance of payout is in the form of cash dividends throughout across ﬁrms, keiretsu ﬁrms
show a relative proportionate reluctance to allow share repurchases to contribute to total
payout. Third, it is also noteworthy that keiretsu ﬁrm payout, as opposed to non-keiretsu
ﬁrm payout, is distinctive in regard to the initiation of share repurchses with a one year lead
in 1999 as well as the striking three-fold spike in total real cash dividend payout, exhibited
by keiretsu ﬁrms, in 2001.10 In contrast, the total real payout of observed non-keiretsu
ﬁrms increases relatively gradually and no such spike in payout is evident.
Table 3 indicates an annual summary of the observed real Japanese yen payout amounts,
corresponding to the illustrations in Figure 2. In addition, the table indicates the average
per ﬁrm payout across payout methods and categories of ﬁrms - all Japanese ﬁrms, keiretsu
ﬁrms and non-keiretsu. It is noteworthy that despite the lead exhibited by keiretsu ﬁrms,
as indicated in ﬁgure 1, in the initiation of share repurchases since 1999, non-keiretsu
ﬁrms tend to payout relatively more real Japanese yen per ﬁrm in this way over time.
The most interesting new ﬁnding, however, indicated by this table is the tendency for the
keiretsu ﬁrm cash dividend and total payout amounts to virtually systematically exceed
the corresponding payout amounts of non-keiretsu ﬁrms, both prior to and since 1999.
Overall, therefore, the payout policy of the keiretsu ﬁrms is relatively conservative over
time. Typically keiretsu ﬁrms tend to payout relatively more, on a per-ﬁrm basis, and there
is an evident preference in keiretsu ﬁrms to payout by way of cash dividends rather than
share repurchases, as initially illustrated in ﬁgure 2.
[Please insert ﬁgure 2 and table 3 about here]
Table 4 indicates the decile distribution, calibrated with respect to total real payout,
of real cash dividend and share repurchase payouts for the observed Japanese, keiretsu
and non-keiretsu ﬁrms during the years 1990, 1999 and 2008. Overall, there has been a
concentration of corporate payout across payout methods, among a small number of ﬁrms,
9There was a 10% ceiling, relative to share face value, on the amount of cash dividends paid in Japan
which was relaxed in 1998, as detailed in Schaede 2006a. Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) indicate that following
a 1998 revision of the Commercial Law ﬁrms were allowed to use their capital reserves for stock repurchases
exceeding 10% of outstanding shares without a requirement of approval at a shareholders’ meeting.
10The primary reason for this spike in cash dividend payout in 2001 is that the keiretsu ﬁrm Techno
Ryowa Limited (ISIN No. JP3545040002) paid 197.04 billion yen in 1990 Prices against.
14in Japan. For example, in 1990 the top two deciles of payers account for 69.7% of cash
dividend payout while this level of concentration increases marginally in 1999, and it grows
to 80.1% of cash dividend payout in 2008. The top two deciles also present a marked increase
in concentration levels with regard to share repurchase payout conducted, rising from 77.5%
in 1999 to 92.3% in 2008. This heightened concentration of payout among payers, across
payout methods in recent times, is corroborated by the presented Herﬁndahl indices, and is
in line with ﬁndings in the United States (Fama and French, 2001 and DeAngelo, DeAngelo
and Skinner, 2004) and in the European Union (von Eije and Megginson, 2008).
Of particular interest, in the Japanese context, is that this growth in concentration levels
stems from the observed non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, there is a marked concentration of
cash dividend payouts (the top two deciles correspond to 61.3% of cash dividend payouts
in 1990, 71.5% in 1999 and 80% in 2008) and share repurchase payouts (the top two deciles
correspond to 70% in 1999 and 92% in 2008) in non-keiretsu ﬁrms over time. In contrast,
the concentration of cash dividend payouts in keiretsu ﬁrms declined between 1990 and 1999
(the top two deciles correspond to 81.1% in 1990 and 76% in 1999) although it remains
relatively high in 2008 (79% in 2008) comparable to 1999 levels. The concentration of
share repurchase payouts in keiretsu ﬁrms declines between 1999 and 2008 according to
the corresponding Herﬁndahl indices while the top two deciles indicate that the level of
concentration is approximately stable (90% in 1999 and 94.5% in 2008), alongside the
growing popularity of this method of payout as detailed in earlier tables. Taking these
ﬁndings together, the keiretsu ﬁrms exhibit relatively conservative behaviour with respect
to the concentration of payout throughout the period, 1990 to 1998, while the non-keiretsu
ﬁrms exhibit a convergence to a comparable level of concentration across cash dividend and
share repurchase payouts over time.
[Please insert table 4 about here]
In table 5 it is indicated that the proportion of cash dividend payers in Japan declines
marginally during the period 2000 to 2003 while the proportion of cash dividend payers
tends to increase thereafter, until 2008. A comparable pattern is evident across keiretsu
and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. In addition, table 5 indicates whether these altering proportions of
Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, which elect to disburse cash dividends, are due to
alterations in company characteristics or due to alterations in the propensity of these ﬁrms
to disburse cash dividends. Alongside the actual proportions of ﬁrms choosing to pay cash
dividends, the table presents the expected out-of-sample estimates of the percent of ﬁrms
expected to be involved in paying cash dividends, provided by logit regressions speciﬁed
to include the important traditional explanatory variables: the market value (SIZE), the
earnings ratio (EA), the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF) and the asset growth
rate (DAA). The speciﬁed regression parameters are estimated during the base period
1990-99. The ﬁndings reveal a declining propensity to pay cash dividends in Japan during
these latter decades, comparable to ﬁndings in the United States (Fama and French, 2001
and Denis and Osobov, 2008) and in Europe (von Eije and Megginson, 2008). In fact, a
comparable declining propensity to pay is evident across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms,
while this declining propensity is relatively pronounced in keiretsu ﬁrms. It is noteworthy,
however, that the variation in ﬁrm characteristics over time results in a relatively stable
expected percentage of ﬁrms paying cash dividends in Japan (ranging from about 90% in
152001 to 94% in 2004) and in non-keiretsu ﬁrms (ranging from about 90% in 2001 to 94%
in 2004). In contrast, the expected percentage of keiretsu ﬁrms paying cash dividends is
relatively varied, ranging from about 90% in 2001 to 98% in 2008. This contrast, between
actual and expected percentages of keiretsu ﬁrms paying cash dividends, is indicative of
a relatively pronounced decline in the propensity to pay in keiretsu ﬁrms which reﬂects
a marked resistance - a relatively conservative cash dividend payout policy. In summary,
in every instance, with respect to Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, the expected
proportion of payers exceeds the actual observed proportion of payers hence indicating a
declining propensity to pay cash dividends over time which is particularly pronounced in
keiretsu aﬃliated ﬁrms.
[Please insert table 5 about here]
In Panel A of Table 6, as well as in Table 7, the results of the logistic random eﬀects
panel regressions are presented which indicate the impact of the explanatory variables,
outlined in Table 1, on the probability of paying cash dividends and repurchasing shares.
These Tables present eleven key ﬁndings.
First, turning to the 4 traditional explanatory variables - ﬁrm size (SIZE), the earnings-
to-assets ratio (EA), the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF) and the asset growth rate
(DAA) - adopted to explain the probability to pay in the United States. In Japan, the ﬁrm
size (SIZE) and the earnings-to-assets ratio (EA) are signiﬁcant with the expected positive
signs with regard to the probability to pay cash dividends while neither the market-to-book
value of the ﬁrm (MBF) nor the asset growth rate (DAA) is signiﬁcant. The size (SIZE)
explanatory variable also impacts the probability of ﬁrms, speciﬁcally non-keiretsu ﬁrms,
to repurchase shares. In addition, it is noteworthy that the impact of the earnings-to-
assets ratio (EA) is declining over time for all ﬁrms as well as with regard to keiretsu and
non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Notwithstanding, the earnings-to-assets ratio (EA) eﬀect is relatively
pronounced with regard to keiretsu ﬁrms.11 Finally, contrary to our expectations, although
the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF) explanatory variable is not signiﬁcant across
all ﬁrms, keiretsu ﬁrms exhibit an emergent signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of this explanatory
variable on the probability to pay cash dividends. Nonethless, the overall eﬀect of the
market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF) explanatory variable is negative and marginally
signiﬁcant for keiretsu ﬁrms.
Second, the leverage ratio (LR) explanatory variable systematically signiﬁcantly impacts
the probability to pay with the expected negative sign over time and across Japanese,
keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, with a signiﬁcantly pronounced eﬀect in the latter sub-
period for keiretsu ﬁrms.12 This result indicates the emerging importance of agency costs
and/or ﬁnancial covenants in inﬂuencing particularly keiretsu ﬁrm cash dividend policy in
Japan. Third, as per our expectation, the operating proﬁtability volatility (INCV) and
income risk (SDS) explanatory variables are associated with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
the probability to pay cash dividends. In regard to income risk (SDS), this eﬀect declines
signiﬁcantly over time across ﬁrms except for keiretsu ﬁrms where the eﬀect is stable over
11It is noteworthy that keiretsu ﬁrms exhibit a declining adjusted earnings to total assets ratio relative
to non-keiretsu ﬁrms.
12It is worthwhile noting that across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms there is a general decline in the rate
of leverage to total assets (LR) over time, which is relatively pronounced for non-keiretsu ﬁrms.
16time and relatively pronounced. Income risk (SDS) also negatively impacts the probability
to conduct share repurchases. Notably, cash ﬂow uncertainty (VOL24) does not impart
a negative inﬂuence on the probability to pay in Japan, except for marginally in the ﬁrst
sub-period.
Fourth, the explanatory variable corresponding to the passage of time (YEAR) indicates
a declining inclination of Japanese ﬁrms to pay cash dividends which is signiﬁcant during
the full period, 1990 to 2008. This ﬁnding, allowing the coeﬃcients to vary over time
and including a wide range of explanatory variables, conﬁrms the results presented in
Table 5 with respect to the propensity of ﬁrms to pay cash dividends and the increasing
concentration of non-keiretsu aﬃliated ﬁrms in particular. In the same context, the results
also conﬁrm a systematic increasing inclination of Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms
to conduct share repurchases over time.
Fifth, the privatized ﬁrms (PRIV) are signiﬁcantly more likely to pay cash dividends
than other ﬁrms and this ﬁnding is robust and across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms in the
latter sub-period. Nevertheless, the process of privatization does not impact the probability
of a ﬁrm to conduct share repurchases. Sixth, the earnings reporting frequency (ERF)
variable has a positive coeﬃcient over the full period as well as the sub-periods, though
this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant during the sub-periods. In addition, a marginally signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect for the earnings reporting frequency (ERF) is estimated on the probability
of ﬁrms to conduct share repurchases. The eﬀect on the probability to pay cash dividends
may follow from the possibility of increased monitoring due to an increased report frequency
to signal qualities of the ﬁrm to investors. Seventh, contrary to the expectations implied
by catering theory, the country speciﬁc catering dummy (CCD) has a signiﬁcant negative
sign both in the whole period and in the latter sub-period. Curiously, this ﬁnding suggests
that ﬁrms are less likely to pay cash dividends when a valuation premium is assigned to
dividend paying ﬁrms. However, our construction of the catering theory dummy variable
using cash dividends may render this explanatory variable less than ideal with regard to
share repurchases. In addition, our use of a lagged catering dummy explanatory variable
may have adversely aﬀected our results.
Eighth, unexpectedly the annual change in stock price measured at the end of the
previous year (DPP) imparts an emergent positive eﬀect on a ﬁrm’s probability of paying
cash dividends. In the ﬁrst sub-period its eﬀect is signiﬁcantly negative while in the latter
sub-period the eﬀect is positive and in the overall period the eﬀect of the DPP variable is
signiﬁcantly positive. Ninth, the cash holdings (CASH) explanatory variable signiﬁcantly
accounts for the probability to pay cash dividends in the ﬁrst sub-period but not in the other
periods. That said, the non-keiretsu ﬁrms exhibit a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent emergent negative
eﬀect of the cash holdings (CASH) variable on the probability to pay cash dividends relative
to the insigniﬁcant eﬀect exhibited by the keiretsu ﬁrms.13 Tenth, as per expactations, the
concentration of ownership (OWN) explanatory variable exhibits a systematic signiﬁcant
negative eﬀect on the probability of ﬁrms to conduct share repurchases, however, there is
no systematic negative eﬀect on the probability of ﬁrms to pay cash dividends.14
13Keiretsu ﬁrms are conspicuous in that they exhibit a decline in the percentage of cash holdings (CASH)
over time.
14It is worthwhile noting that across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, there is a decline in the concentration
of ownership (OWN), which is relatively pronounced for keiretsu ﬁrms.
17Finally, the remaining explanatory variables, concerning ﬁrm age (AGE) and retained
earnings to total equity (RETE), have no impact on the likelihood of ﬁrms to pay cash
dividends, except in regard to keiretsu ﬁrms where there is an emergent positive eﬀect
documented over time. In addition, older keiretsu ﬁrms tend to be less likely to decide to
repurchase shares while, in line with our expectations, non-keiretsu ﬁrms are increasingly
likely to repurchase shares over time.
[Please insert tables 6 and 7 about here]
Turning now to investigate the impact of the explanatory variables, outlined in Table 1,
on the amounts of real cash dividends paid and the shares repurchased. In Panel B of Table
6, as well as in Table 8, the results of our random eﬀects panel regressions are presented.
In total, these Tables also present ten key ﬁndings.
First, as we anticipated, the age of the ﬁrm (AGE) and the retained earnings to total
equity (RETE) explanatory variables positively inﬂuence the amounts of real cash dividends
paid in the full period, however, the eﬀects in the sub-periods are not signiﬁcant. That said,
there does appear to be an emergent positive eﬀect associated with the retained earnings
to total equity (RETE) explanatory variable in keiretsu ﬁrms and also a positive eﬀect is
documented with regard to share repurchases in non-keiretsu ﬁrms. The ﬁrm size (SIZE)
explanatory variable positively impacts both the amount of real cash dividends and share
repurchases, with an increasing positive eﬀect over time on these real cash dividend payouts.
In addition, it is noteworthy that the eﬀects of ﬁrm size (SIZE) are more pronounced with
regard to keiretsu ﬁrms than non-keiretsu ﬁrms although these eﬀects are growing with
regard to the amount of real cash dividends paid by non-keiretsu ﬁrms over time.
Second, as expected, the concentration of ownership (OWN) variable impacts negatively
the amounts of both real cash dividends and share repurchase payouts. However, this neg-
ative eﬀect stems from with non-keiretsu ﬁrms for share repruchases. Also, as anticipated,
the cash holdings (CASH) variable positively impacts the amount of real payouts although
this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant in the latter sub-period with regard to real cash dividends and
the positive eﬀect on share repurchases stems from non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Unexpectedly, the
leverage ratio (LR) positively impacts real cash dividend payouts over the full period and
this eﬀect becomes more pronounced over the sub-periods - stemming from non-keiretsu
ﬁrms. This curious result implies that heightened leverage is associated with greater cash
dividend payouts.
Third, as per our expectation, earnings (EA) positively impact the amount of real cash
dividends paid with the magnitude of this eﬀect growing over time with respect to non-
keiretsu ﬁrms. This increase in the sensitivity of cash dividends to earnings is in stark
contrast to the ﬁndings of Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) and Skinner (2008)
with regard to the payout behaviour of ﬁrms listed in the United States.
Fourth, the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF) impacts real cash dividends neg-
atively as per our expectations although this eﬀect is declining over the sub-periods. Cu-
riously, the asset growth variable (DAA) indicates the need to ﬁnance assets appears to
impact real cash dividends positively albeit with a small eﬀect. Fifth, concerning the ex-
planatory variables related to uncertainty, income risk (SDS) negatively impacts real cash
dividends paid, as per our expectation, with this eﬀect becoming increasingly pronounced
18over time in respect to non-keiretsu ﬁrms. In contrast, there is an unexpected positive
impact of the cash ﬂow uncertainty (Vol24) and operating proﬁtability volatility (INCV)
variables in the earlier sub-period although this is not evident in the later sub-period or the
full period. This anomolous cash ﬂow uncertainty (Vol24) inﬂuence stems primarily from
the keiretsu ﬁrms examined. That said, the cash ﬂow uncertainty (VOL24) variable does
negatively impact the real share repurchase amounts of the keiretsu ﬁrms examined.
Sixth, the earnings reporting frequency (ERF) variable inﬂuences real cash dividend
payouts positively in the ﬁrst sub-period and in the full period however it is associated
with a negative inﬂuence on real cash dividends in the second sub-period. This emergent
ﬁnding of a negative inﬂuence may reﬂect a pressure on ﬁrms to disburse more cash as
the earning reporting frequency (ERF) per annum declines, due to increased informational
asymmetries.
Seventh, our catering dummy (CCD) variable presents an unexpected negative inﬂuence
on real cash dividends paid in the full period examined, however, in the latter sub-period
there is a signiﬁcant emergent positive eﬀect. This ﬁnding indicates some support for the
catering theory across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms during the latter sub-period, from
2000 to 2008. That said, our model speciﬁcation to assess the catering theory may not be
altogether appropriate as this theory speciﬁcally relates to the probability of cash payouts
rather than their real value amounts.
Eighth, the annual change in stock price measured at the end of the previous year (DPP)
variable exhibits an unexpected emergent albeit small positive eﬀect on real cash dividend
amounts and the repurchase of shares with this marginal eﬀect originating primarily from
the non-keiretsu ﬁrms in the latter sub-period and with regard to share repurchases. Ninth,
with respect to the expected positive privatization (PRIV) eﬀects on real cash dividends
and share repurchases, the estimated eﬀects are positive and they diﬀer signiﬁcantly across
keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. In particular, while there are emergent positive eﬀects on
real cash dividend amounts in keiretsu ﬁrms these eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. In contrast,
there are positive eﬀects on real cash dividend amounts in non-keiretsu ﬁrms throughout
the period. In addition, the positive impact of privatization on share repurchase amounts
in keiretsu ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher than its impact in non-keiretsu ﬁrms, where there
are no such eﬀects. As a result, ﬁrms that were once state owned but are now privatized
are not only more likely to pay cash dividends, as indicated in Table 6 Panel A and Table
7, than other ﬁrms but they also payout more when they do decide to pay.
Finally, as per the the growth in real payouts documented in Figure 2, the passage of
time (YEAR) explanatory variable suggests an emergent positive impact on the payout of
real cash dividends which diﬀers across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, this
emergent positive eﬀect stems both from keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, although in the
full period the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly more pronounced in non-keiretsu ﬁrms.
[Please insert table 8 about here]
5 Responsiveness to Earnings
In Table 9 we present ﬁndings with respect to whether cash dividend payouts are becoming
decreasingly responsive to earnings - more conservative - and whether the total payouts,
19of ﬁrms, which also conduct share repurchases, are becoming increasingly responsive to
earnings as indicated by Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) and Skinner (2008)
for US data. In order to accomplish this, we construct a data set corresponding to regular
payers and regular repurchasers. Speciﬁcally, we consider 1159 ﬁrms, during the period
1990-2008, which pay cash dividends at least at 5 year intervals and 573 ﬁrms which conduct
share repurchases at least at 3 year intervals. Hence, we consider ﬁrms which disburse 97%
of total cash dividend payout during the period 1990 -2008 and 79% of share repurchase
payout during this period. At the same time, the set of ﬁrms examined comprises 84%
of the ﬁrms that pay cash dividends and 42% of the ﬁrms that conduct share repurchases
during this period.
In particular, our analyses involve the estimation of stylized Lintner (1956) regression
models for cash dividends, share repurchases and total payout for our constructed data set
of the industrial ﬁrms, which regularly payout, in Japan. We use pooled regression analysis
with robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level for this estimation. Our stylized
Lintner (1956) regression models are speciﬁed :
∆Dt = α0 + α1EBIATt − α2Dt−1 + ǫt.
where ∆Dt corresponds to a contemporary change in payout, EBIATt corresponds to
contemporary earnings before interest and after tax, Dt−1 corresponds to payout lagged
by one year. In the Equation α1 represents the sensitivity to earnings coeﬃcient and α2
the speed of adjustment coeﬃcient. Elsewhere in the Table, N corresponds to the number
of observations and PoR to the target payout ratio, which is evaluated as (α1/α2). We
estimate the Eq. (1) for two sub-periods (1990 to 1999 and 2000 to 2008), across cash
dividends, share repurchses and total payout, in order to examine how the relation between
earnings and payout evolves over time.
In Table 9, in the panel A with respect to cash dividends, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly stronger
eﬀect of earnings on cash dividends over time, with the predicted signs, with regard to
Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is in contrast to the Brav, Graham,
Harvey, and Michaely (2005) and Skinner (2008) ﬁndings in the United States, though it is
in line with the ﬁndings of von Eije and Megginson (2008) in Europe. Moreover, the speed
of adjustment of cash dividends to earnings increases signiﬁcantly with respect to time,
especially for keiretsu ﬁrms (from 0.12 to 0.73; from 0.07 to 0.92 and from 0.20 to 0.31 for
Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, respectively). In addition, there is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the speed of adjustments exhibited by keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms
in the second sub-period, where the speed of adjustment of keiretsu ﬁrms’ cash dividend
payout to earnings is relatively quick since 1999. Finally, with regard to cash dividends,
the target payout ratio rises across Japanese ﬁrms (from .08 to .11) and non-keiretsu ﬁrms
(from 0.09 to 0.17) and it remains approximately stable with regard to keiretsu ﬁrms (from
0.06 to 0.05). Taking these ﬁndings together, there is an increasing sensitivity of cash
dividend payout to earnings across ﬁrms in Japan and the speed of adjustment is relatively
quick in keiretsu ﬁrms and their targetr payout ratio is relatively stable.
In regard to share repurchases, in panel B of the table, we also ﬁnd increases in the
earnings coeﬃcient of share repurchases over time, however, these increases are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant in keiretsu ﬁrms although these increases are statistically signiﬁcant
20across Japanese and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. The corresponding speed of adjustment param-
eters decline signiﬁcantly across the Japanese ﬁrms and the non-keiretsu ﬁrms although
the decline is insigniﬁcant for keiretsu ﬁrms. So, while share repurchases in Japan and in
non-keiretsu ﬁrms show signiﬁcant increases in their responsiveness to variation in earnings,
these ﬁrms which regularly payout cash, become more reluctant to let repurchases follow
earnings quickly. This ﬁnding is in line with the von Eije and Megginson (2008) ﬁnding, for
regular payers in the European Union, that share repurchases follow earnings signiﬁcantly
more closely, albeit more slowly, in the 2001 to 2005 sub-period. Once again inferred target
payout ratios rise considerably across Japanese and non-keiretsu ﬁrms although the tar-
get payout ratio remains approximately stable over time for keiretsu ﬁrms. Overall, these
ﬁndings suggest that keiretsu ﬁrms exhibit relatively conservative share repurchase policies
over time.
Turning to total payout, in panel C of the table, the stylized Lintner (1956) regression
models show an increase in the impact of earnings over time on total payout for Japanese
ﬁrms, non-keiretsu ﬁrms and keiretsu ﬁrms, although this increase is not signiﬁcant for
keiretsu ﬁrms. Clearly, these increases stem both from a rise in the sensitivity of cash
dividends and the sensitivity of share repurchases to earnings, albeit the eﬀect arises largely
from a rise in the sensitivity of cash dividends to earnings, particularly for keiretsu ﬁrms.
Furthermore, the speed of adjustments of total payouts to earnings increase signiﬁcantly
over time, especially for keiretsu ﬁrms (from 0.13 to 0.63; from 0.03 to 0.89 and from
0.25 to 0.57 for Japanese, keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms, respectively). This increased
sensitivity of payout to earnings is comparable to ﬁndings in the United States presented
in Skinner (2008). Again, the same pattern of increasing target payout ratios is evident
over time across Japanese ﬁrms, non-keiretsu ﬁrms although not across keiretsu ﬁrms.
Taken together, these ﬁndings indicate that ﬁrms in Japan, when setting payout policy,
are increasingly responsive to earnings, albeit this eﬀect is less pronounced with regard to
keiretsu ﬁrms and their share repurchases policies.
In line with the ﬁndings presented in von Eije and Megginson (2008), in regard to the
European Union, earnings in Japan in the latter sub-period, 2000 to 2008, inﬂuence cash
dividends more than share repurchases, across both keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Find-
ings for the total payout version of the stylized Lintner (1956) regression model, compared
to the cash dividend version of this model, are stronger for non-keiretsu ﬁrms although the
ﬁndings across these models are similar for Japanese ﬁms and for keiretsu ﬁrms. Overall,
this indicates that non-keiretsu ﬁrms, in particular, increasingly avail of cash dividends and
share repurchases , rather than just cash dividends, to absorb the variation in ﬁrm earnings.
In contrast, it is evident that keiretsu ﬁrm payouts are relatively conservative over time.
[Please insert Table 9 about here]
6 Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this article we evaluate the relative importance of agency-cost theory, catering theory,
life-cycle theory and signaling theory to explain corporate payout policy in Japan. We avail
of a large database of listed industrial corporations, during the period 1990 through to 2008,
to examine the evolution of cash dividends as well as share repurchases and the impact, if
21any, of a wide range of pertinent proxy explanatory variables with regard to actual payouts
in Japan. In addition, we speciﬁcally examine the corporate payout policies of groupings of
keiretsu aﬃliated and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms both prior to and since the so-called ’big bang’
of deregulation and corporate governance reform in Japan.
Our ﬁndings can be summarised by three sets of key points. First, the ﬁndings in-
dicate that as in the United States, share repurchases in Japan have grown strikingly -
across keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrm groupings - even relative to cash dividends which
have also increased. This rapid growth in cash dividends and share repurchases in Japan
commences in 1999 in the immediate wake of the enactment of a raft of legislation aimed
at reforming Japanese corporate governance. Unlike in the United States, however, cash
dividends remain the dominant form of payout across the groupings of keiretsu aﬃliated
and non-aﬃliated ﬁrms in Japan. Second, speciﬁc to the keiretsu grouping of ﬁrms is a com-
parative reticence to alter its corporate payout policy. In particular, the keiretsu ﬁrms tend
to disburse relatively large amounts of cash throughout, they persist in relying relatively
heavily on cash dividends rather than share repurchases, they show a relatively pronounced
tendency to discontinue paying cash dividends as well as a relatively pronounced respon-
siveness to earnings. Furthermore, the cash dividend payouts in keiretsu ﬁrms have been
relatively concentrated, while these payouts from non-keiretsu ﬁrms concentrate increas-
ingly over time. These ﬁndings are consistent with a continuing relative absence of agency
costs and informational asymmetries in aﬃliated keiretsu ﬁrms compared with non-keiretsu
ﬁrms. Third, controlling for a large set of pronounced eﬀects, previously documented in
the literature, we examine the relative importance in explaining corporate payout of proxy
explanatory variables associated with the phase of the ﬁnancial life-cycle of the ﬁrm, the
presence of agency costs, the ﬁrm’s investment opportunity set, uncertainty in the ﬁrms’
cashﬂows, information asymmetries, the recent stock market performance, catering theory
eﬀects, whether the ﬁrm has been privatized and a secular trend in payouts over time. The
ﬁndings suggest inter alia that larger ﬁrms are more likely to payout and if they decide to
do so they tend to payout more. As the level of concentration of ownership in Japanese
ﬁrms increases the amount of cash dividends disbursed decreases. Privatized ﬁrms are more
likely to pay cash dividends and if they decide to do so and they are not keiretsu aﬃliated
they tend to payout more. Taken together, these ﬁndings reﬂect a marked growth in payout
in Japan since 1999 across all ﬁrms however this occurs against the backdrop of a relative
reluctance on the part of keiretsu ﬁrms to alter their payout policies. With respect to the
various theories of corporate payout considered, the relative importance of agency costs
and life cycle theory to explain the payout policies of Japanese ﬁrms is particularly evident
from the regression analyses with regard to both the likelihood to pay of Japanese ﬁrms
and their payout amounts.
It is well established that corporate governance in Japan diﬀers dramatically from that
in the U.S., but researchers come to diﬀerent conclusions about whether agency costs or
information asymmetries are principally responsible for the timing and form of the distinc-
tiviness of corporate payout policy in Japan. Overall, we ﬁnd in support of the agency cost-
based life cycle theory to explain corporate payout policy determination across Japanese
ﬁrms.
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26Figure 1: Number of industrial ﬁrms in Japan paying cash dividends and
repurchasing shares, 1990 to 2008
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Notes. The ﬁgure’s key is explained as follows. The reference Japan All Firms refers to the total number of ﬁrms
observed in Japan, disclosing their payout policies, in a particular year. Of these, ﬁrms which pay cash dividends or
repurchase shares in a particular year are referred to as Japan Payers. The ﬁrms which choose to discontinue payout in
a speciﬁc year, although they were involved in payout in the previous year, are referred to with the reference Japan Did
Pay . The reference Keiretsu All Firms refers to the total number of Keiretsu ﬁrms observed in Japan, disclosing their
payout policies, in a particular year. Of these, ﬁrms which pay cash dividends or repurchase shares in a particular year
are referred to as Keiretsu Payers.
27Figure 2: Payout by industrial ﬁrms in Japan, in billions of real (1990 prices)

































































Notes. The ﬁgure’s key is explained as follows. The key reference Total Payout indicates the total real payout in Yen for
a speciﬁc year. The references Dividends and Repurchases indicate the real payout in Yen for a speciﬁc year, in terms
of cash dividends and share repurchases, respectively.
28Table 1: Description of the variables used in the random eﬀects panel regression
models.
Regressors Description
Cash Dividends The logarithm of the total real value of common cash dividends distributed by the
(DIV) ﬁrm, in Japanese Yen 1990 prices. The logistic random eﬀects panel regression models
are speciﬁed to include a dummy variable =1 if cash dividends are paid, otherwise zero.
Share Repurchases The logarithm of the total real value of open market share repurchases undertaken by
(SR) the ﬁrm, in Japanese Yen 1990 prices. The logistic random eﬀects panel regression models
are speciﬁed to include a dummy variable =1, if share repurchases occur, otherwise zero.
Regressands Description
Firm Ownership (OWN) The percentage of common stock held by the ten largest shareholders.
Cash Holding (CASH) The sum of cash and short term investments as a percentage of the total assets of the ﬁrm.
Leverage Rate (LR) The sum of short-term and long-term debt as a percentage of total assets.
Age of the Calculated as the diﬀerence between the year of incorporation of the ﬁrm and the most
ﬁrm (AGE) recent year. Source: Amadeus
Retained Earnings The retained earnings as a percentage of the market value of ﬁrm equity.
(RETE)
Asset Growth (DAA) The relative (percentage) change in the real value of total assets.
Market to Book The market to book value of the ﬁrm.
Value (MBF)
Market Value (SIZE) Percentile ranking (annual) of a ﬁrm with respect to the criterion of market value.
Earnings Ratio (EA) The ﬁrm earnings before interest but after tax as a percentage of total assets.
Catering Theory A dummy variable (annual), which indicates whether the cash dividend payer (share
Proxy Variable repurchaser) has a higher median logarithmic median MBF than the cash dividend (share
(CCD) repurchaser) non payer. If true, dummy = 1 otherwise it’s zero. A further requirement
for a year speciﬁc non-zero dummy variable is a minimum of ﬁve observations for both
payers and non-payers.
Earning Reporting The frequency (1 to 4 times) at which earnings are reported per annum. 4 = Annual and
Frequency (ERF) 1 = Quarterly Reporting.
Cash-Flow The standard deviation of stock returns over the most recent three year period
Uncertainty (VOL24)
Operating The standard deviation of the operating rate of return (i.e., operating income
Proﬁtability as a percentage of total assets) during the most recent three year period, including the
Volatility (INCV) current ﬁscal year.
Income Risk (SDS) The standard deviation of the net income during the most recent ﬁve year period divided
by the most recent year-speciﬁc total sales.
Year (YEAR) Year of Observation.
Privatized (PRIV) A dummy variable, which indicates whether a company is privatized. If true, dummy=1,
otherwise zero. Privatization means the ﬁrm was once owned by the state, but this is no
longer the case.
Stock Return (DPP) The annual percentage change in stock price measured at the end of the previous year.
Constant (CONST) The intercept of the regression equation.
29Table 2: Cash dividend and share repurchase data for industrial ﬁrms in Japan, 1990 to 2008
Firms Firms
with that
Firms Firms data pay
with Firms with avail- both
cash Firms that Firms share Firms Firms able Firms Firms divid- Amount Real
divid- that do not that repur- Firms that that for both that that ends paid amount Real
Number end pay pay abandon chase that do not abandon divid only only and in real paid to value
of data cash cash cash data repur- repur- share ends and pay repur- share cash repur of
listed avail- divid- divid- divid- avail- chase chase repur- repur- cash chase repur- divid chase total
Year ﬁrms able ends ends ends able shares shares chase chase dividends shares chases ends shares payout
1990 1226 423 399 24 43 1 42 43 41 0 1 139.86 0.01 139.87
1991 1346 590 553 37 4 56 3 53 1 56 52 0 3 188.04 1.36 189.41
1992 1371 613 579 34 4 61 1 60 2 61 60 0 1 234.81 0.50 235.31
1993 1381 657 615 42 13 75 3 72 1 75 71 0 3 274.60 0.22 274.83
1994 1438 706 648 58 23 85 5 80 2 85 79 0 5 319.01 0.14 319.15
1995 1505 749 670 79 27 89 4 85 2 89 84 0 4 365.74 0.10 365.84
1996 1550 784 695 89 19 102 3 99 3 102 98 0 3 321.03 0.06 321.09
1997 1603 803 712 91 11 100 5 95 1 100 94 0 5 306.70 0.02 306.72
1998 1746 967 879 88 3 66 8 58 1 66 58 0 8 321.91 8.40 330.30
1999 1804 982 872 110 33 49 10 39 2 49 37 0 10 360.37 24.13 384.50
2000 1875 1019 879 140 49 488 211 277 3 488 242 14 197 494.56 106.09 600.65
2001 1909 1122 962 160 19 603 254 349 41 602 304 17 237 592.84 101.51 694.35
2002 1971 1188 1000 188 17 768 388 380 35 767 320 19 369 418.83 191.52 610.36
2003 2034 1245 999 246 54 807 477 330 30 804 269 39 436 455.33 402.32 857.64
2004 2119 1297 1063 234 12 808 472 336 55 806 279 25 445 584.83 339.85 924.68
2005 2202 1329 1121 208 15 823 512 311 39 822 270 23 489 684.09 371.49 1055.58
2006 2304 1348 1157 191 19 833 525 308 58 832 279 32 493 839.03 599.68 1438.70
2007 2364 1361 1190 171 23 838 495 343 76 838 310 19 476 1074.16 835.96 1910.12
2008 2404 1371 1210 161 19 840 538 302 56 839 265 11 526 1483.16 937.50 2420.66
Total 34152 18554 16203 2351 364 7534 3915 3619 408 7524 3212 199 3711 9458.91 3920.86 13379.77
Notes. The table indicates an annual summary of the total number of Japanese ﬁrms observed corresponding to Figure 1. In addition, it presents an annual summary of
the number of observations of ﬁrms which disclose both their cash dividend and their share repurchase policies, the observed number of ﬁrms which pay only cash dividends
or conduct only share repurchases and the table presents the annual summary of the number of observations of ﬁrms which conduct both types of payout. The table also
presents the real value of total payout, cash dividends and share repurchases each year in billions of Yen (1990 prices).
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0Table 3: The real value (1990 prices) of payout in billions of Japanese Yen, 1990 to 2008
Cash Dividends Share Repurchases Total Payout
Year Japan Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu Japan Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu Japan Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu
1990 139.86 (0.35) 59.02 (0.55) 80.84 (0.28) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 0.00 0.01 (0.01) 139.87 (0.35) 59.02 (0.55) 80.85 (0.28)
1991 188.04 (0.34) 74.31 (0.56) 113.73 (0.27) 1.36 (0.45) 0.00 0.00 1.36 (0.45) 189.41 (0.34) 74.31 (0.56) 115.10 (0.27)
1992 234.81 (0.41) 84.50 (0.62) 150.31 (0.34) 0.50 (0.50) 0.00 0.00 0.50 (0.50) 235.31 (0.41) 84.50 (0.62) 150.81 (0.34)
1993 274.60 (0.45) 90.06 (0.65) 184.55 (0.39) 0.22 (0.07) 0.08 (0.08) 0.14 (0.07) 274.83 (0.45) 90.14 (0.65) 184.69 (0.39)
1994 319.01 (0.49) 101.18 (0.74) 217.83 (0.43) 0.14 (0.03) 0.11 (0.06) 0.03 (0.01) 319.15 (0.49) 101.30 (0.74) 217.86 (0.43)
1995 365.74 (0.55) 107.64 (0.78) 258.10 (0.49) 0.10 (0.03) 0.08 (0.04) 0.02 (0.01) 365.84 (0.55) 107.72 (0.78) 258.13 (0.49)
1996 321.03 (0.46) 87.70 (0.64) 233.33 (0.42) 0.06 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 321.09 (0.46) 87.72 (0.64) 233.37 (0.42)
1997 306.70 (0.43) 85.41 (0.61) 221.30 (0.39) 0.02 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.00) 306.72 (0.43) 85.41 (0.61) 221.31 (0.39)
1998 321.91 (0.37) 85.79 (0.55) 236.12 (0.33) 8.40 (1.05) 0.00 0.00 8.40 (1.05) 330.30 (0.38) 85.79 (0.55) 244.52 (0.34)
1999 360.37 (0.41) 83.83 (0.57) 276.54 (0.38) 24.13 (2.41) 14.78 (4.93) 9.35 (1.34) 384.50 (0.44) 98.62 (0.68) 285.89 (0.39)
2000 494.56 (0.56) 86.35 (0.62) 408.20 (0.55) 106.09 (0.50) 24.72 (0.73) 81.37 (0.46) 600.65 (0.67) 111.07 (0.78) 489.58 (0.65)
2001 592.84 (0.62) 275.23 (1.91) 317.62 (0.39) 101.51 (0.40) 18.12 (0.38) 83.39 (0.40) 694.35 (0.71) 293.34 (1.98) 401.01 (0.48)
2002 418.83 (0.42) 86.96 (0.59) 331.87 (0.39) 191.52 (0.49) 14.93 (0.24) 176.59 (0.54) 610.36 (0.60) 101.89 (0.67) 508.46 (0.59)
2003 455.33 (0.46) 84.10 (0.61) 371.23 (0.43) 402.32 (0.84) 46.49 (0.64) 355.83 (0.88) 857.64 (0.83) 130.58 (0.87) 727.06 (0.82)
2004 584.83 (0.55) 113.41 (0.78) 471.42 (0.51) 339.85 (0.72) 49.34 (0.72) 290.51 (0.72) 924.68 (0.85) 162.75 (1.07) 761.93 (0.81)
2005 684.09 (0.61) 122.63 (0.78) 561.46 (0.58) 371.49 (0.73) 77.70 (0.97) 293.79 (0.68) 1055.58 (0.92) 200.33 (1.24) 855.25 (0.87)
2006 839.03 (0.73) 159.42 (0.97) 679.60 (0.69) 599.68 (1.14) 65.16 (0.81) 534.52 (1.20) 1438.70 (1.21) 224.58 (1.31) 1214.12 (1.19)
2007 1074.16 (0.90) 178.24 (1.06) 895.93 (0.88) 835.96 (1.69) 51.02 (0.65) 784.93 (1.88) 1910.12 (1.58) 229.26 (1.35) 1680.86 (1.62)
2008 1483.16 (1.23) 253.79 (1.46) 1229.37 (1.19) 937.50 (1.74) 120.96 (1.46) 816.54 (1.79) 2420.66 (1.98) 374.75 (2.13) 2045.91 (1.96)
Total 9458.91 (0.58) 2219.55 (0.81) 7239.36 (0.54) 3920.86 (1.00) 483.52 (0.78) 3437.35 (1.04) 13379.77 (0.82) 2703.07 (0.97) 10676.70 (0.78)
Notes. The table indicates the payout amounts in relation to either cash dividends or repurchases in billions of Japanese Yen (1990 prices) by the
industrial ﬁrms in Japan, both keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Figures presented in brackets correspond to the ‘per-capita’ or average payout per ﬁrm
in billions of Japanese Yen (1990 prices).
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1Table 4: The decile distribution of real cash dividends and share repurchases for the Japanese, Keiretsu and Non -
Keiretsu industrial ﬁrms for the years 1990, 1999 and 2008
Japan Keiretsu Non - Keiretsu
Cash Dividends Share Repurchases Cash Dividends Share Repurchases Cash Dividends Share Repurchases
1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008 1990 1998 1999 2008 1990 1998 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008 1990 1999 2008
10th 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
20th 1.48 0.76 0.33 0.00 0.13 0.04 0.62 0.90 0.49 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 2.00 0.85 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.03
30th 2.23 1.73 0.97 0.00 0.65 0.11 1.29 1.58 1.32 1.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 2.94 1.85 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.13
40th 2.95 2.51 1.52 0.00 1.78 0.26 1.76 2.09 1.92 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 3.82 2.69 1.52 0.00 6.27 0.27
50th 3.65 3.35 2.24 100.00 0.00 0.86 2.24 2.69 2.67 2.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 4.65 3.56 2.25 0.00 0.00 0.95
60th 4.84 4.45 3.20 0.00 4.06 0.77 3.18 3.79 4.03 3.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 6.03 4.64 3.20 100.00 0.00 0.87
70th 6.33 5.95 4.47 0.00 11.20 2.11 4.33 4.98 5.39 4.73 0.00 0.00 9.79 1.64 7.78 6.18 4.47 0.00 10.47 2.08
80th 8.51 8.59 7.18 0.00 4.67 3.57 5.47 8.28 8.33 6.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.90 10.74 8.75 7.38 0.00 13.43 3.85
90th 12.15 13.75 12.90 0.00 22.31 11.22 8.48 12.73 13.94 17.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 16.97 14.84 13.96 12.86 0.00 12.05 8.86
100th 57.50 58.92 67.20 0.00 55.21 81.04 72.62 62.87 61.89 62.01 0.00 0.00 90.00 77.42 46.45 57.51 67.11 0.00 57.77 82.94
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Amt. B. JPY 139.86 360.37 1483.16 0.01 24.13 937.50 59.02 857.88 83.83 253.79 0.00 0.00 14.78 120.96 80.84 276.54 1229.37 0.01 9.35 816.54
Observation 423 982 1371 43 49 840 120 171 170 188 16 20 16 124 303 812 1183 27 33 716
Herﬁndahl 0.362 0.381 0.477 1.000 0.371 0.671 0.542 0.424 0.415 0.424 0.000 0.000 0.820 0.629 0.264 0.366 0.476 1.000 0.381 0.698
Notes. Obs. indicates the number of observations used in the calculation. Amt. presents the amounts, in billions of Japanese Yen (1990 prices), disbursed with regard to
either cash dividends or share repurchases. Herf. is the value of the Herﬁndahl index, which represents an equal distribution over the deciles if its value is 0.10, while the
highest possible concentration is indicated by a Herﬁndahl value of 1.00.
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2Table 5: Accounting for changing ﬁrm characteristics, is there a declining propensity to pay cash dividends by the
industrial ﬁrms in Japan?
Japan Keiretsu Non - Keiretsu
Expected Expected Expected
Total Actual Actual Expected (%) - Total Actual Actual Expected (%) - Total Actual Actual Expected (%) -
ﬁrms payers payers payers Actual ﬁrms payers payers payers Actual ﬁrms payers payers payers Actual
Year (no.) (no.) (%) (%) (%) (no.) (no.) (%) (%) (%) (no.) (no.) (%) (%) (%)
1990 -
1999 727 662 91.06% 165 147 89.09% 563 516 91.65%
2000 1019 879 86.26% 92.57% 6.31% 190 151 79.47% 96.02% 16.55% 829 728 87.82% 90.22% 2.40%
2001 1122 962 85.74% 89.95% 4.21% 194 157 80.93% 90.16% 9.24% 928 805 86.75% 87.19% 0.44%
2002 1188 1000 84.18% 90.44% 6.27% 194 160 82.47% 91.54% 9.07% 994 840 84.51% 87.34% 2.83%
2003 1245 999 80.24% 93.59% 13.35% 196 150 76.53% 96.37% 19.84% 1049 849 80.93% 91.67% 10.73%
2004 1297 1063 81.96% 94.40% 12.44% 196 159 81.12% 96.57% 15.44% 1101 904 82.11% 93.58% 11.48%
2005 1329 1121 84.35% 92.59% 8.24% 201 169 84.08% 94.30% 10.22% 1128 952 84.40% 91.62% 7.22%
2006 1348 1157 85.83% 91.33% 5.50% 202 176 87.13% 92.56% 5.43% 1146 981 85.60% 89.75% 4.15%
2007 1361 1190 87.44% 93.15% 5.71% 201 180 89.55% 98.08% 8.53% 1160 1010 87.07% 91.21% 4.15%
2008 1371 1210 88.26% 93.56% 5.30% 204 186 91.18% 98.37% 7.20% 1167 1024 87.75% 91.24% 3.50%
Notes. Our base period extends from 1990-1999 and comprises of all ﬁrms observed during this period. The number of ﬁrms per year, or the average per
period, is detailed in the column ‘Total ﬁrms (no.)’. The explanatory variables, speciﬁed in our logit regressions, are the earnings ratio (EA), the asset growth
rate (DAA), the market value (SIZE) and the market-to-book value of the ﬁrm (MBF). The ‘Actual payers (%)’ ﬁgures reﬂects the observed ratio of payers
to total ﬁrms times 100. The ‘Expected payers (%)’ ﬁgures are computed by adopting the arithmetic mean of the yearly regression coeﬃcients during the
base period, 1990-1999, and using updated data on the observed explanatory variables period-by-period to estimate the probability that each ﬁrm would pay
in each subsequent period, averaging that probability across ﬁrms for each year, and multiplying the result times 100. The ‘Expected (%) - Actual (%)’ is
the propensity to pay i.e. it reﬂects the percent diﬀerential between anticipated and realized payout.
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3Table 6: Random eﬀects panel regression for the likelihood to pay and the real amounts paid by listed industrial cash
dividend payers and by share repurchasers in Japan, 1990 to 2008 and two subperiods (for cash dividends only).
Likelihood to pay Amount paid
Cash dividends Share repurchases Cash dividends Share repurchases
1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
AGEt 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.57 0.00 0.79 0.01a 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00c 0.33 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.12
SIZEt−1 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01a 0.00 0.02a 0.00 0.02c 0.00 0.03b,d 0.00 0.04a 0.00
RETEt−1 0.00 0.86 0.00c 0.67 0.00b 0.75 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00b 0.22 0.00 0.11
OWNt−1 0.00 0.81 0.02c 0.18 0.00 0.73 -0.02a 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00
CASHt−1 0.00a 0.54 0.03 0.02 -0.01b 0.24 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.01
LRt−1 -0.10 0.00 -0.12 0.00 -0.12b 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00d 0.07 0.00 0.38
EAt−1 0.15a 0.00 0.27c 0.00 0.11b,d 0.00 -0.01 0.40 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03d 0.00 0.00 0.87
DAAt−1 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.27 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51
MBFt−1 0.00a 0.84 -0.01 0.76 0.00b 0.94 0.00 0.44 -0.02 0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.51
V ol24t−1 0.00 0.73 -0.01 0.09 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.46 0.00a 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00b,d 0.36 0.00 0.49
INCVt−1 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.00 0.73 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.21 0.01 0.18
SDSt−1 -0.23a 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -0.22d 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.30 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.56
ERFt−1 0.24 0.02 0.04 0.80 0.12 0.52 -0.12 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.03d 0.02 -0.11 0.11
CCDt−1 -0.53 0.00 N/A -0.92 0.01 -0.31 0.04 -0.13 0.00 N/A 0.08d 0.00 0.21 0.20
DPPt−1 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.89 0.00a 0.00 0.00c 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRIV 22.03 0.00 21.84 0.00 21.74 0.00 -0.64 0.47 1.32a 0.00 1.20c 0.10 1.22b 0.00 1.14a 0.15
Y EARt -0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.26 -0.01 0.90 0.35 0.00 0.02a 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.10d 0.00 0.03 0.32
CONST 106.58 0.05 151.66 0.24 30.34 0.86 -702.14 0.00 -45.03a 0.00 62.05c 0.00 -209.44b,d 0.00 -64.49 0.30
Obser. 10806 4508 6298 6358 9784 4000 5784 3572
Group 1091 750 1077 841 1053 721 981 676
Wald 439.80 188.25 152.86 644.48 2682.38 N/A 2241.64 258.87
Prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000
R2 wit. 34.78% 17.79% 36.82% 0.68%
R2 bet. 70.74% 78.59% 66.04% 25.70%
R2 ove. 63.42% 73.95% 60.90% 16.50%
Notes. Table 1 provides a description of the speciﬁed explanatory variables. The dependent variable for the likelihood to pay applies here to cash dividends
(share repurchases) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a company pays dividends (repurchases shares), and zero if its payout is zero. The dependent
variable for the amount paid is the natural logarithm of the amount of cash dividends (share repurchases) paid by cash dividend (share repurchases) payers
in 100 million Japanese Yen in 1990 prices. The symbol C corresponds to the regression coeﬃcient of each explanatory variable and P corresponds to the
the level of signiﬁcance of the z-value calculated using a bootstrap technique 500 times (for likelihood to pay) and a robust estimation technique at ﬁrm level
(for the amount paid). Except for the explanatory variables YEAR, PRIV and AGE, all variables are speciﬁed with a one year lag. The term ’Observation’
corresponds to the total number of observations for which information was available. Group is the number of groups for which observations were available.
Wald is the Wald chi-square statistics of the equation for seventeen independent variables and Probability indicates the signiﬁcance of the equation Wald
chi-square statistic. R
2 wit. is the within group R-square statistic, R
2 bet. is the between groups R-square statistic and R
2 ove. is the overall R-square
statistic. Coeﬃcient superscripts ’a’, ’b’ and ’c’ correspond to a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the corresponding time-period speciﬁc coeﬃcients
for keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Coeﬃcient superscript ’d’ indicates a statistically signiﬁcant change in the corresponding coeﬃcient over time.
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4Table 7: Logistic random eﬀects panel regression for the likelihood to pay cash dividends and make share repurchases
by the Keiretsu and Non - Keiretsu industrial ﬁrms, 1990 to 2008 and two subperiods (for cash dividends only).
Keiretsu Non - Keiretsu
Cash dividends Share repurchases Cash dividends Share repurchases
1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
AGEt 0.00 0.80 -0.01 0.54 0.01 0.54 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.92 0.02 0.00
SIZEt−1 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00
RETEt−1 0.00 0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.01d 0.07 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.71
OWNt−1 -0.02 0.20 -0.04 0.24 -0.01 0.63 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.43 -0.02 0.00
CASHt−1 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.33 0.02 0.31 0.01 0.33 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.16 -0.02d 0.03 0.00 0.64
LRt−1 -0.11 0.00 -0.14 0.00 -0.18 0.00 0.00 0.85 -0.09 0.00 -0.11 0.00 -0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.00
EAt−1 0.26 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.24d 0.00 -0.04 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.10d 0.00 -0.01 0.48
DAAt−1 0.00 0.58 -0.01 0.40 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.63 0.01 0.30 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.88
MBFt−1 -0.18 0.10 -0.37 0.13 0.37d 0.07 -0.03 0.68 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.38
V ol24t−1 0.00 0.99 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.36 0.00 0.71 -0.01 0.46 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.45
INCVt−1 -0.06 0.09 0.02 0.73 -0.17 0.06 0.01 0.82 -0.08 0.00 -0.15 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.02 0.16
SDSt−1 -0.32 0.00 -0.32 0.00 -0.31 0.01 -0.06 0.31 -0.21 0.00 -0.31 0.00 -0.21d 0.00 -0.02 0.07
ERFt−1 0.14 0.39 0.06 0.87 0.02 0.97 -0.03 0.88 0.31 0.01 0.06 0.77 0.27 0.22 -0.13 0.09
CCDt−1 -0.86 0.01 N/A -1.60 0.02 0.08 0.83 -0.33 0.14 N/A -0.62 0.13 -0.39 0.02
DPPt−1 0.00 0.54 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.53
PRIV 18.51 0.00 404.58 N/A 17.59 0.00 0.31 0.93 19.92 0.99 18.99 1.00 22.03 0.00 -0.62 0.48
Y EARt -0.01 0.90 -0.23 0.10 -0.06 0.78 0.48 0.00 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.49 -0.06 0.53 0.32 0.00
CONST 20.62 0.84 465.67 0.09 120.34 0.76 -955.88 0.00 165.31 0.01 110.67 0.48 132.67 0.51 -647.88 0.00
Obser. 2308 1148 1160 1244 8498 3360 5138 5114
Group 190 168 187 136 901 582 890 705
Wald 140.61 N/A 49.10 152.66 317.72 145.12 141.90 495.15
Prob. 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes. Table 1 provides a description of the speciﬁed explanatory variables. The dependent variable for the likelihood to pay applies here to cash
dividends (share repurchases) is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a company pays dividends (repurchases shares), and zero if its payout is zero.
The symbol C corresponds to the regression coeﬃcient of each explanatory variable and P corresponds to the the level of signiﬁcance of the z-value
calculated using bootstrap technique 500 times. Except for the explanatory variables YEAR, PRIV and AGE, all variables are speciﬁed with a one
year lag. The term ’Observation’ corresponds to the total number of observations for which information was available. Group is the number of groups
for which observations were available. Wald is the Wald chi-square statistics of the equation for seventeen independent variables and Probability
indicates the signiﬁcance of the equation Wald chi-square statistic.
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5Table 8: Random eﬀects panel regressions for the real amounts paid by listed industrial Keiretsu and Non - Keiretsu
cash dividend payers and share repurchasers, 1990 to 2008 and two sub-periods (for cash dividends only).
Keiretsu Non - Keiretsu
Cash dividends Share repurchases Cash dividends Share repurchases
1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 2008
C P C P C P C P C P C P C P C P
AGEt 0.00 0.52 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.15
SIZEt−1 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03d 0.00 0.03 0.00
RETEt−1 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.01d 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.66 0.00d 0.32 0.00 0.02
OWNt−1 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.85 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00
CASHt−1 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.01
LRt−1 0.00 0.37 0.00 0.78 0.00d 0.55 -0.01 0.38 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.96 0.00d 0.06 0.00 0.56
EAt−1 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03d 0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03d 0.00 0.00 0.80
DAAt−1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.59
MBFt−1 -0.04 0.12 -0.15 0.00 -0.05d 0.10 0.00 0.99 -0.01 0.17 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.59
V ol24t−1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.19
INCVt−1 0.00 0.84 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.49 0.02 0.77 0.00 0.85 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.31 0.01 0.28
SDSt−1 -0.03 0.14 -0.01 0.52 -0.01 0.47 0.02 0.54 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.51 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.59
ERFt−1 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.05d 0.16 -0.04 0.83 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.03d 0.04 -0.13 0.10
CCDt−1 -0.09 0.05 N/A 0.07 0.38 0.60 0.13 -0.14 0.00 N/A 0.08d 0.00 0.11 0.54
DPPt−1 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00d 0.17 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PRIV 0.04 0.75 -0.14 0.24 0.12d 0.34 1.43 0.00 1.52 0.00 1.55 0.07 1.40 0.00 1.17 0.21
Y EARt 0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.00 0.10d 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.11d 0.00 0.04 0.21
CONST -22.50 0.07 74.48 0.00 -191.55d 0.00 1.46 0.99 -57.43 0.00 56.17 0.00 -218.39d 0.00 -84.89 0.19
Obser. 2024 1008 1016 627 7760 2992 4768 2945
Group 183 160 167 104 870 561 814 572
Wald 1303.63 N/A 775.59 457.54 2194.46 N/A 2020.76 210.79
Prob. 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000 0.000 N/A 0.000 0.000
R2 wit. 28.23% 24.88% 27.71% 3.10% 39.00% 16.52% 42.18% 0.85%
R2 bet. 78.94% 82.54% 71.56% 41.33% 68.70% 78.15% 65.02% 23.55%
R2 ove. 66.06% 77.96% 61.50% 27.87% 63.35% 73.14% 61.79% 14.99%
Notes. Table 1 provides a description of the speciﬁed explanatory variables. The dependent variable for the amount paid is the natural logarithm of the
amount of cash dividends (share repurchases) paid by cash dividend (share repurchases) payers in 100 million Japanese Yen in 1990 prices. The symbol C
corresponds to the regression coeﬃcient of each explanatory variable and P corresponds to the the level of signiﬁcance of the z-value calculated using a robust
estimation technique at ﬁrm level. Except for the explanatory variables YEAR, PRIV and AGE, all variables are speciﬁed with a one year lag. The term
’Observation’ corresponds to the total number of observations for which information was available. Group is the number of groups for which observations
were available. Wald is the Wald chi-square statistics of the equation for seventeen independent variables and Probability indicates the signiﬁcance of the
equation Wald chi-square statistic. R
2 wit. is the within group R-square statistic, R
2 bet. is the between groups R-square statistic and R
2 ove. is the
overall R-square statistic.
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6Table 9: Estimates of the Lintner (1956) model for industrial ﬁrms in Japan, Keiretsu and Non - Keiretsu
Japan Keiretsu Non-Keiretsu
1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008 1990 - 1999 2000 - 2008
C P C P C P C P C P C P
Panel A: Cash dividends
EBIATt 0.01 0.04 0.08b 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05b 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.05b 0.06
Div.t−1 -0.12 0.10 -0.73a;b 0.00 -0.07 0.02 -0.92b 0.00 -0.20 0.14 -0.31b 0.30
Intercept 0.49 0.01 2.81a;b 0.00 0.43 0.00 6.96b 0.00 0.61 0.07 1.01b 0.27
N 6055 9809 1300 1541 4755 8268
Adj.R2 (PoR) 8.74% 0.08 33.53% 0.11 6.10% 0.06 45.75% 0.05 15.25% 0.09 14.55% 0.17
Panel B: Share repurchases
EBIATt 0.00 0.07 0.03b 0.04 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.03b 0.09
SRt−1 -0.95 0.00 -0.48a;b 0.00 -3.25 0.25 -0.92 0.00 -0.94 0.00 -0.45b 0.00
Intercept 0.85a 0.04 3.02a;b 0.00 1.64 0.32 5.65b 0.00 0.63 0.01 2.76b 0.00
N 457 4223 115 645 342 3578
Adj.R2 (PoR) 6.64% 0.00 19.21% 0.05 0.25% 0.00 38.59% 0.01 23.45% 0.00 18.07% 0.07
Panel C: Total payout
EBIATt 0.01 0.01 0.11b 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12b 0.00
Tot.Pay.t−1 -0.13 0.07 -0.63b 0.00 -0.03 0.47 -0.89b 0.00 -0.25 0.03 -0.57b 0.01
Intercept 0.57 0.00 3.87a;b 0.00 0.38 0.00 9.12b 0.00 0.71 0.01 2.94b 0.03
N 6710 10208 1360 5350 8626
Adj.R2 (PoR) 8.68% 0.09 26.43% 0.18 0.86% 0.09 42.84% 0.06 20.95% 0.09 23.04% 0.21
Notes. The table presents annual estimates and adjusted R square statistics for a stylized (1956) Lintner model for the industrial
ﬁrms in Japan with at least ﬁve cash dividend observations and atleast three share repurchase observation for two time periods; 1990
to 1999 and 2000 to 2008. We use pooled regression analysis with robust standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level for our study.
∆Dt = α0 +α1EBIATt −α2Dt−1 +ǫt. ∆Dt corresponds to a contemporary change in payout, EBIAT corresponds to contemporary
earnings before interest and after tax, Dt−1 corresponds to lagged payout by one year. N corresponds to the number of observations
and (PoR) to the target payout ratio (α1/α2). Coeﬃcient superscript ’a’ indicates a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
corresponding coeﬃcients on keiretsu and non-keiretsu ﬁrms. Coeﬃcient superscript ’b’ indicates a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
with respect to the corresponding coeﬃcient over time.
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